@InProceedings{2016:Schmerl:Raindroid,
      AUTHOR = {Schmerl, Bradley and Gennari, Jeffrey and C\'{a}mara, Javier and Garlan, David},
      TITLE = {Raindroid - A System for Run-time Mitigation of Android Intent Vulnerabilities (Poster)},
      YEAR = {2016},
      MONTH = {19-21 April},
      BOOKTITLE = {Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security},
      ADDRESS = {Pittsburgh, PA},
      PDF = {http://acme.able.cs.cmu.edu/pubs/uploads/pdf/raindroid-poster.pdf},
      ABSTRACT = {Modern frameworks are required to be extendable as well as secure. However, these two qualities are often at odds. In this poster we describe an approach that uses a combination of static analysis and run-time management, based on software architecture models, that can improve security while maintaining framework extendability. We implement a prototype of the approach for the Android platform. Static analysis identifies the architecture and communication patterns among the collection of apps on an Android device and which communications might be vulnerable to attack. Run-time mechanisms monitor these potentially vulnerable communication patterns, and adapt the system to either deny them, request explicit approval from the user, or allow them.},
      KEYWORDS = {Human-in-the-loop, Rainbow, Science of Security}
}