Architecture-Based Self-Protection: Composing and Reasoning about Denial-of-Service Mitigations
Bradley Schmerl,
Javier Cámara, Jeffrey Gennari,
David Garlan,
Paulo Casanova,
Gabriel A. Moreno,
Thomas J. Glazier and
Jeffrey M. Barnes.
In HotSoS 2014: 2014 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security, Raleigh, NC, USA, 8-9 April 2014.
Online links: 
Abstract
| Security features are often hardwired into software
applications, making it difficult to adapt security responses to
reflect changes in runtime context and new attacks. In prior
work, we proposed the idea of architecture-based self-protection
as a way of separating adaptation logic from application logic
and providing a global perspective for reasoning about security
adaptations in the context of other business goals. In this paper,
we present an approach, based on this idea, for combating denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks. Our approach allows DoS-related tactics
to be composed into more sophisticated mitigation strategies
that encapsulate possible responses to a security problem. Then,
utility-based reasoning can be used to consider diff erent business
contexts and qualities. We describe how this approach forms the
underpinnings of a scientific approach to self-protection, allowing
us to reason about how to make the best choice of mitigation
at runtime. Moreover, we also show how formal analysis can
be used to determine whether the mitigations cover the range
of conditions the system is likely to encounter, and the e ffect of
mitigations on other quality attributes of the system. We evaluate
the approach using the Rainbow self-adaptive framework and
show how Rainbow chooses DoS mitigation tactics that are
sensitive to diff erent business contexts. |
Keywords: Assurance, Autonomic Systems, Landmark, Model Checking, Rainbow, Science of Security, Self-adaptation, Stitch.
@InProceedings{2014/Schmerl/ABSP-DoS,
AUTHOR = {Schmerl, Bradley and C\'{a}mara, Javier and Gennari, Jeffrey and Garlan, David and Casanova, Paulo and Moreno, Gabriel A. and Glazier, Thomas J. and Barnes, Jeffrey M.},
TITLE = {Architecture-Based Self-Protection: Composing and Reasoning about Denial-of-Service Mitigations},
YEAR = {2014},
MONTH = {8-9 April},
BOOKTITLE = {HotSoS 2014: 2014 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security},
ADDRESS = {Raleigh, NC, USA},
PDF = {http://acme.able.cs.cmu.edu/pubs/uploads/pdf/absp-dos2014_Schmerl_ABSP-DoS.pdf},
ABSTRACT = {Security features are often hardwired into software
applications, making it difficult to adapt security responses to
reflect changes in runtime context and new attacks. In prior
work, we proposed the idea of architecture-based self-protection
as a way of separating adaptation logic from application logic
and providing a global perspective for reasoning about security
adaptations in the context of other business goals. In this paper,
we present an approach, based on this idea, for combating denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks. Our approach allows DoS-related tactics
to be composed into more sophisticated mitigation strategies
that encapsulate possible responses to a security problem. Then,
utility-based reasoning can be used to consider diff erent business
contexts and qualities. We describe how this approach forms the
underpinnings of a scientific approach to self-protection, allowing
us to reason about how to make the best choice of mitigation
at runtime. Moreover, we also show how formal analysis can
be used to determine whether the mitigations cover the range
of conditions the system is likely to encounter, and the e ffect of
mitigations on other quality attributes of the system. We evaluate
the approach using the Rainbow self-adaptive framework and
show how Rainbow chooses DoS mitigation tactics that are
sensitive to diff erent business contexts.},
KEYWORDS = {Assurance, Autonomic Systems, Landmark, Model Checking, Rainbow, Science of Security, Self-adaptation, Stitch}
}
|
